

FROM THE BOOKSHELF NO. 169
JOHN ALBERT

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"HENRY KISSINGER: THE ANGUISH OF POWER"
BY JOHN STOESSINGER

ANNCR: THE VOICE OF AMERICA BRINGS YOU ANOTHER IN THE WEEKLY SERIES ... FROM THE BOOKSHELF ... A SERIES IN WHICH WE REPORT ON BOOKS AMERICAN ARE READING. TODAY JOHN ALBERT'S REPORT ON "HENRY KISSINGER: THE ANGUISH OF POWER" BY JOHN STOESSINGER, PUBLISHED BY NORTON.

EDITOR: PROFESSOR STOESSINGER, WHO TEACHES POLITICAL SCIENCE AT HUNTER COLLEGE IN NEW YORK CITY, IS AN OLD FRIEND OF HENRY KISSINGER. THEY WERE BOTH REFUGEES FROM NAZI GERMANY WHEN, AS STUDENTS, THEY MET AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY. BUT THIS BOOK IS FAR MORE THAN AN APOLOGIA OR A SINGLE-MINDED SONG OF PRAISE. MISTER STOESSINGER WANTS TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT BY STEERING A COURSE BETWEEN THE EXAGGERATED EARLY ADULATION AND THE MORE RECENT WAVE OF CONDEMNATION. YET HIS FINAL EVALUATION IS UNEQUIVOCALLY FAVORABLE: JOHN STOESSINGER WRITES AT THE END: "I THINK THE WORLD IS A SAFER PLACE TODAY BECAUSE OF HIS (KISSINGER'S) COURAGE AND HIS VISION. IT MIGHT EVEN BE A LITTLE BETTER. NO MORTAL MAN CAN ASK FOR MORE."

THE AUTHOR EXPLORES KISSINGER'S COLORFUL CAREER, AND HE SAYS THAT IN ALL HIS ROLES, AND LONG BEFORE HE BECAME PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR AND SECRETARY OF STATE, KISSINGER HAS HELD A CONSISTENT WORLD VIEW FROM WHICH HE HAS NEVER DEVIATED, EVEN IN GREAT ADVERSITY.

EDITOR: AS FAR BACK AS HIS COLLEGE DAYS, STOESSINGER WRITES, KISSINGER
(CONT'D) CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ATTAINMENT OF A STABLE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER IS THE HIGHEST POLITICAL AIM AND THAT
FURTHER, SUCH ORDER ENTAILS THE CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF
LEGITIMATE STATES FROM WHICH THE REVOLUTIONARY STATE MUST BE
ELIMINATED. THIS CRUCIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN A "LEGITIMATE"
AND A "REVOLUTIONARY" STATE, THE AUTHOR MAINTAINS, HAS
GUIDED KISSINGER IN ALL HIS DIPLOMATIC ENDEAVORS AND HAS
DETERMINED HIS PRIORITIES.

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THE AUTHOR ONCE ASKED KISSINGER WHAT HE WOULD DO IF THE
LEADER OF A LEGITIMATE STATE PURSUED UNJUST ENDS, WHILE A
REVOLUTIONARY HAD JUSTICE ON HIS SIDE. IN ANSWER KISSINGER
QUOTED A REMARK OF GOETHE: "IF I HAD TO CHOOSE BETWEEN
JUSTICE AND DISORDER, ON THE ONE HAND, AND INJUSTICE AND ORDER,
ON THE OTHER, I WOULD CHOOSE THE LATTER."

THUS, THE ESSENCE OF KISSINGER'S STATECRAFT BECAME THE USE
OF DIPLOMACY, BACKED BY FORCE, TO ACHIEVE A STABLE
EQUILIBRIUM. ACCORDING TO STOESSINGER, KISSINGER'S
INTELLECTUAL VISION OF A STABLE WORLD ORDER, DEVELOPED A
QUARTER OF A CENTURY AGO, HAS SURVIVED ALMOST UNCHANGED UNTIL
THE PRESENT TIME. "WE ARE WITNESS HERE," PROFESSOR
STOESSINGER WRITES, "TO A UNIQUE EXPERIMENT IN THE APPLICATION
OF SCHOLARSHIP TO STATESMANSHIP, OF HISTORY TO STATECRAFT."

WITH THIS EXPLANATION OF THE KISSINGER WORLD VIEW, THE
AUTHOR APPROACHES KISSINGER'S CONCRETE POLICIES. FOR
EXAMPLE, STOESSINGER SAYS KISSINGER WAS CONVINCED THAT A
CORRECT COMBINATION OF DIPLOMACY AND POWER WOULD BRING ABOUT

EDITOR: A RESOLUTION OF THE VIETNAM WAR IN A WAY WHICH WOULD NOT LOOK TO AMERICA'S ALLIES LIKE ABANDONMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM. BUT STOESSINGER NOTES THAT THERE WAS A CRUCIAL FLAW IN KISSINGER'S APPROACH -- THE FACT THAT NORTH VIETNAM HAD NEVER CEASED TO BE A "REVOLUTIONARY" STATE WITHIN KISSINGER'S OWN DEFINITION OF THE TERM. KISSINGER, HE SAYS, ERRONEOUSLY REGARDED HIS MEETINGS WITH NORTH VIETNAM'S LE DUC THO AS NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN TWO "LEGITIMATE" STATES WHICH WOULD ULTIMATELY HAVE TO STRIKE A BARGAIN. THE AUTHOR LEAVES NO DOUBT THAT HE REGARDS THE KISSINGER POLICY IN THE VIETNAM CASE A TRAGIC FAILURE.

THE DETENTE POLICY WITH THE SOVIET UNION, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS SEEN BY MISTER STOESSINGER AS THE SUCCESSFUL CENTERPIECE OF KISSINGER'S FOREIGN POLICY, NOT BECAUSE IT HAS SOLVED ALL PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS, BUT "FOR THE OVERRIDING REASON" THAT IT HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO AVOID A NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION. "I BELIEVE," WRITES STOESSINGER, "THAT IF SUCH A WORLD CATAclysm HAS BECOME LESS LIKELY, THIS IS IN NO SMALL MEASURE TO BE CREDITED TO KISSINGER."

PROFESSOR STOESSINGER ADMITS, HOWEVER, THAT DRAWING UP A BALANCE SHEET OF THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF DETENTE IS A MATTER ON WHICH THOUGHTFUL PEOPLE MAY HAVE WIDELY DIFFERENT OPINIONS.

THE AUTHOR REGARDS THE OPENING OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA AS PROBABLY KISSINGER'S MOST "UNCONTAMINATED TRIUMPH IN HIS TENURE AS A STATESMAN." ONCE HE PERCEIVED THE DEPTH OF THE RIFT BETWEEN CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION, STOESSINGER SAYS, KISSINGER BECAME CONVINCED THAT RAPPROCHEMENT WITH CHINA

EDITOR: MIGHT MAKE THE SOVIET UNION MORE RECEPTIVE TO A GENUINE
(CONT'D) DETENTE.

STOESSINGER IS MUCH LESS FAVORABLY IMPRESSED WITH KISSINGER'S POLICY TOWARD EUROPE, WHICH, HE POINTS OUT, WAS NEGLECTED IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE KISSINGER STEWARDSHIP. EUROPE, THE AUTHOR BELIEVES, BROUGHT OUT THE NEGATIVE SIDE OF HIS PERSONAL DIPLOMACY AND HIS RELUCTANCE TO DELEGATE RESPONSIBILITY. / IN

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THE CASE OF PORTUGAL, FOR EXAMPLE, STOESSINGER SEES THE SECRETARY OF STATE AS HAVING GENERALLY IGNORED THE ADVICE OF EXPERIENCED FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS. ALSO, HE THINKS THAT, CONTRARY TO THE VIEWS OF AMERICA'S EUROPEAN ALLIES, KISSINGER FOR A LONG TIME REGARDED PORTUGAL AS LOST TO COMMUNISM.

THE AUTHOR RESERVES HIS MOST SEVERE CRITICISM FOR KISSINGER'S RECORD ON CYPRUS, WHICH, HE ARGUES, DEMONSTRATES ALL THE WEAKNESS OF PERSONAL DIPLOMACY, AND WHICH HE SAYS CAUSED ANTI-AMERICAN REACTIONS IN BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY.

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"NO SINGLE INDIVIDUAL," THE AUTHOR OBSERVES, "NOT EVEN A MAN OF THE ENORMOUS TALENT AND INTELLECT OF HENRY KISSINGER, COULD DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH MULTIPLE CRISES SIMULTANEOUSLY WITHOUT DELEGATING AT LEAST SOME RESPONSIBILITY TO OTHERS."

MISTER STOESSINGER STRONGLY DEFENDS THE KISSINGER RECORD IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAYS KISSINGER MANAGED TO NARROW THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS MORE SUCCESSFULLY THAN ANY OTHER MEDIATOR IN THE LONG HISTORY OF THAT TRAGIC CONFLICT. HERE AGAIN THE AUTHOR SEES EQUILIBRIUM AS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE. KISSINGER'S METHOD WAS TO PUT PRESSURE ON

EDITOR: ISRAEL TO TRADE TERRITORY FOR SECURITY. KISSINGER'S ROLE
(CONT'D) IN THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, STOESSINGER WRITES, WAS NEITHER PRO-ISRAEL NOR PRO-ARAB. HIS POLICY WAS ALWAYS DETERMINED BY A FIRM BELIEF THAT ONLY A WAR WITHOUT VICTORY OR DEFEAT FOR EITHER SIDE COULD CONTAIN THE SEEDS OF PEACE.

THE AUTHOR AGREES WITH THOSE CRITICS WHO SAY THAT KISSINGER FOR A LONG TIME SHOWED NO INTEREST IN THE PROBLEMS OF AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA, AND THE THIRD WORLD IN GENERAL, AND THAT HE NEGLECTED ECONOMIC QUESTIONS. BUT AFTER THE OIL EMBARGO AND THE HEATING UP OF THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT, STOESSINGER SAYS KISSINGER QUICKLY TURNED HIS ATTENTION TO THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS. HE WORKED OUT A POLICY ON ENERGY, ON THE WORLD FOOD PROBLEM, AND TRIED TO STEER THE THIRD WORLD STATES AWAY FROM CONFRONTATION POLITICS WITH THE DEVELOPED NATIONS. / HIS COMPASSION FOR THE WORLD'S DISPOSSESSED, SAYS

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STOESSINGER, CAME LATE, BUT WHEN IT CAME, IT WAS SINCERE. THE BOOK WAS NOT WRITTEN IN TIME TO INCLUDE AN ADEQUATE EVALUATION OF THE KISSINGER INITIATIVES IN AFRICA.

STOESSINGER DEFENDS KISSINGER'S PERSONAL DIPLOMACY AS SOMETHING THAT HAD LITTLE TO DO WITH HIS EGO. "I BELIEVE," HE WRITES, "THAT, IN ORDER FOR KISSINGER TO SUCCEED IN HIS MOST HISTORIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES, HE HAD TO ESTABLISH PERSONAL DOMINANCE OVER THE BUREAUCRACY. TO ESTABLISH SUCH CONTROL, MOREOVER, HE HAD TO ACT DECISIVELY, OFTEN SECRETLY, AND AT TIMES, ALONE." / THE AUTHOR BELIEVES

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KISSINGER WAS RIGHT IN HIS ASSUMPTION THAT, IN ORDER TO PUT INTO EFFECT A COHERENT GLOBAL POLICY, HE WOULD HAVE TO CONCENTRATE AS MUCH POWER IN HIS HANDS AS POSSIBLE."